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More than eighty years after the seminal work of Berle & Means (1932), the corporate 
governance (CG) literature is continuing to advance our understanding of the various 
implications of the separation of ownership and control in public firms. In particular, at the level 
of the firm, the literature has examined both theoretically and empirically the internal and 
external governance mechanisms that monitor and moderate managerial influence and power. 
Specifically, there is an extensive literature on internal mechanisms, such as an effective board of 
directors (Adams et al, 2010; Pugliese et al., 2009; Van Den Berghe & Levrau, 2004; ), and 
external mechanisms, such as monitoring by large shareholders and institutional investors (Gillan 
& Starks, 2000; McLaren, 2004).   
Of course, these governance mechanisms do not eliminate the possibility that managers 
get entrenched because it becomes costly and difficult for boards and shareholders to remove 
them. The literature advances several reasons for managerial entrenchment. For example, 
organizational theorists argue that tenure and CEO’s internal power are positively related (e.g., 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989), making it difficult for boards to wrest control from long-serving 
CEOs. Furthermore, shareholder actions, such as proxy motions against management, are costly 
for individual shareholders to undertake (Fluck, 1999) and sometimes not even legally binding. 
Similarly, takeover threats by external blockholders are financially costly, and often not credible 
threats for management of large companies (Cyert et al., 2002). In addition, managers may pro-
actively choose actions that facilitate entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  
Our knowledge of the consequences of such entrenchment and the moderating role of 
ownership structure is still limited, and thus is a fertile area for research by CG scholars. There is 
evidence that entrenchment and weak governance have negative consequences for operational 
and financial performance (Core et. al., 1999). In addition, the recent literature has shown that 
entrenched managers are more likely to choose investment and financial policies that are not in 
the best interests of firms’ various stakeholders (Hu & Kumar, 2004; Kang et al., 2006; Kumar & 
Rabinovitch, 2013). However, many important questions remain unanswered in the literature. In 
particular, we need research on the impact of ownership structures and managerial entrenchment 
on other important areas of firm performance, such as innovation and financial transparency. 
This type of research should build on findings, for example, that ownership types matter for 
broader areas of performance, such as corporate social responsibility (Dam & Scholtens, 2012). 
More broadly, while entrenchment and its interaction with ownership structure are typically 
analyzed through the lens of agency theory, how can we broaden the conceptual framework to 
allow insights from other theoretical frameworks, such as institutional and resource-based 
theories?   
In this issue, we have three papers that examine these issues and generate significant new 
results and insights. In the first paper, Lodh et al. examine the incentive effects of family 
ownership for innovation productivity, an issue that has thus far received limited attention in the 
literature on family ownership. But it is well known that growth opportunities generated by 
innovations and development of new economic opportunities are central to the evolution of 
industries and economic growth (Schumpeter, 1942; Romer, 1990). Moreover, family ownership 
is probably the most widely prevalent form of business globally. Hence, the findings of this 
study are important and timely, especially for emerging economies. On the one hand, the impact 
of innovations is especially significant for the economic growth of emerging economies.  On the 
other hand, the relatively undeveloped institutional structures in such economies constrain 
innovation activity. In these countries, family ownership and affiliation with family-owned 
business groups can potentially offset the deficiencies of the institutional structure (Zattoni et al., 
2009). From a theoretical perspective, the emerging market setting provides an interesting 
tension between the predictions of agency and institutional theories regarding innovation. Using 
data on publicly listed firms in India during 2001-2008, Lodh et al. find that family ownership 
has a positive influence on innovation productivity, even after controlling for endogeneity in 
ownership structure. They also find that business group affiliation amplifies the positive relation 
of family ownership to innovation.  
The Lodh et al. study nevertheless indicates that interfacing with stock markets through 
public listing and using professional managers may further increase innovation productivity of 
family firms, which is consistent with other studies (Choi et al., 2012). Indeed, as we noted 
above, the literature considers the role of large external shareholders, in particular institutional 
investors and the problems that constrain their effectiveness in monitoring management (Webb et 
al., 2003). However, there is considerable heterogeneity in such investors, owning to differences 
in objectives, investment horizons, and investment styles. The literature has thus far paid 
relatively little attention to this heterogeneity. In particular, there is little information on the types 
of institutional investors that appear to be more effective in constraining management. The paper 
by Wang advances significantly our understanding on this important issue. Using data on UK 
firms from 1997-2010, Wang analyzes the question: What type of institutional investors 
constrains strategic earnings management (through accruals management) by corporate insiders? 
Such types of accounting manipulation make the performance of the firm more opaque to outside 
investors (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009).  The results show that the level of holdings, 
the investment strategies adopted by the institutional investor, and the duration of the investment 
holdings are all implicated in the effectiveness of managerial monitoring. Intuitively, one expects 
that there must be a minimum level of holdings, activist investment style, and reasonable 
investment duration for institutional investors to have a significant impact in constraining 
management’s attempts at income-inflating accruals management. Wang’s study confirms this 
intuition and generates additional results of interest. It will contribute in bringing much needed 
clarity in an important CG area. 
Finally, the study by Lin et al. examines the effects of managerial entrenchment in 
resisting changes in national level regulatory changes that are made to improve governance 
performance at the firm level. This issue is important for the CG literature because there is 
substantial interest in improving our understanding of the links between national- and firm-level 
governance variables (Bamberger, 2008; Cuomo et al., 2013; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Zattoni & 
Judge, 2012). Specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was passed in the U.S. in 2002 in 
response to many corporate governance scandals, requires management to disclose the quality of 
their internal accounting and financial controls. Lin et al. study whether CEO characteristics are 
systematically related to firms’ exploitation of weak internal controls to serve the self-interest of 
management, such as inflated earnings reports. Using archival data on a large sample of U.S. 
firms, they find that entrenched CEOs are more likely to exploit weak internal controls, while 
older CEOs who have smaller remaining career horizons to benefit from such manipulation, are 
less likely to do so. This study uses a natural experiment, namely, an exogenous change in 
governance-related regulation to clarify the moderating role of management characteristics on 
the effects of national governance variables on firm-level governance performance.  This type of 
approach may be useful in clarifying the role of other firm-level characteristics, such as variables 
related to the board and other stakeholders, in moderating the effects of national governance 
factors on corporate governance mechanisms.     
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